University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1993

Clear Thinking about Insider Preferences: A Reply
Jay Lawrence Westbrook

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Westbrook, Jay Lawrence, "Clear Thinking about Insider Preferences: A Reply" (1993). Minnesota Law Review. 1589.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1589

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Clear Thinking About Insider Preferences:
A Reply
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
Only so strange a creature as a law professor could grow
excited about the effect of the decision in Levit v. Ingersoll Financial Corp.' on indirect-preferences in bankruptcy. I wrote
about that subject in these pages about a year ago in an Article
called Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences.2 I recently
drew a passionate response (the "Response") from a fellow professor, Peter Alces. 3 I had written in defense of Levit, which
had been the target of unrelenting attack. 4 Imagine my surprise at being attacked by a supporter of Levit. This brief Reply 5 is intended to strengthen the case for retaining the rule in
Levit, which the recent Response inadvertently has
undermined.
The essence of the Levit case is that a lender who persuades an insider to guarantee its loan effectively extends the
preference period against itself to one year, because of the indirect benefit to the insider guarantor arising from any payment
of the guaranteed debt.6 The fact that the insider benefits from
payment causes the lender's preference exposure to be extended to the one-year period applicable to preferences made to
insiders. Many argued that Levit discouraged the obtaining of
* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas at
Austin. I am grateful to Elizabeth Warren and Douglas Laycock for their
comments. I am also grateful for the research assistance of Jennifer Frasier,
University of Texas, J.D. expected 1994.
1. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
2. Jay L. Westbrook, Two Thoughts About InsiderPreferences, 76 MINN.
L. REV. 73 (1991).
3. Peter A. Alces, Rethinking Professor Westbrook's Two Thoughts
About Insider Preferences, 77 MINN. L. REV. 605 (1993).
4. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 73 n.2.
5. Because it is so late in the year, the editors were able to give me only
a very limited space in which to respond unless I were willing to delay response until November, 1993. Among other things, so late a publication date
might postdate congressional action on Levit.
6. Because of my limited space, I refer the reader to my original article
for a summary of Levit. See id, at 75-76.
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perfectly legitimate guaranties. I defended Levit by distinguishing more-legitimate guaranties from less-legitimate ones
and arguing that Levit would not operate to discourage the
more-legitimate ones.7
I also defended a constraint Judge Easterbrook imposed on
the rule developed in his Levit opinion. The constraint made
the rule applicable only where the insider had a reimbursement
claim against the debtor, that is, where the insider was a creditor.8 I defended this limitation against the argument that it
would give rise to the risk that routine waivers of reimbursement by insiders would obviate the Levit rule.9 I argued that
attempted waivers should not weaken the Levit rule, because
such waivers need never be recognized and enforced by the
courts.1 0
Professor Alces believes I botched the defense of Levit
(which he supports passionately, except for its failure to go
nearly far enough 1 ). Regrettably, he offers no Levit defense of
his own, but only a debater's brief criticizing my Article. In the
process, he makes a number of odd mistakes. The two principal categories of mistakes are these: first, he ignores all my
primary and strongest arguments supporting Levit in favor of
critiquing the secondary and tertiary points, thus making Levit
look much less defensible than it is, no doubt to the joy of the
well-heeled lobbyists plotting its demise; and second, he misreads the facts of the central hypothetical to which the second
half of the Article is devoted, producing utter analytical
confusion.
Given considerations of space and the varying interests of
readers, from the general to the technical, this Reply is organized for ease of reference. The Reply begins with the primary
policy points, the points about which congressional staffers,
among others, will be most concerned. It then touches on the
policy implications of the boundaries Levit establishes for its
7. Id at 80.
8. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1189-92 (7th Cir.
1989). One important result would be that payments to lenders would not be
subject to the one-year preference period where the insider was not a guarantor so that any benefit to the insider would be relatively unquantified and indirect. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 96-97.
9. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 87-88.
10. Id. at 88.
11. E.g., Alces, supra note 3, at 627 (arguing that Levit's creditor requirement must be abrogated).
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own doctrine. Finally, it addresses some of the points that are
important only to those with a technical interest.
I. PRIMARY POLICY ISSUES
There were two policy arguments of greatest importance in
my Article. First, Levit states a desirable rule because it will
not discourage lenders from getting legitimate guaranties, but
will discourage lenders from getting guaranties that have no
purpose but to leverage preferential treatment for the lenders;
and second, attempted waivers of Levit should not be enforced.
The rest of the Article was devoted to more technical points
that I hope were interesting and of some value, but these two
points were the key policy arguments. The Response ignored
them both and in doing so made Levit look far less defensible
than it really is.
A. LENDER DISINCENTIVE TO TAKE PURE-LEVERAGE
GUARANTIES
The first important policy consideration is that Levit will
not much discourage the type of insider guaranties that may be
regarded as legitimate, but will provide some disincentive for
less-legitimate guaranties. Less-legitimate guaranties are those
that have no purpose except to provide leverage for preferring
the lender over other creditors of the debtor company. The Response simply ignores this crucial issue.-2
In Two Thoughts, I distinguished "true" from "pure-leverage" insider guarantors. A true guarantor is one who gives personal security (for example, stocks and bonds) to support the
guaranty or one who is financially able to respond to a judgment on the guaranty (for example, a person with other substantial business interests). 13 By contrast, a leverage guarantor
is one who puts up no security for the guaranty and is unlikely
to be able to pay any judgment on the guaranty. 14 Both types
of guaranties give the lender leverage over insiders. They are
distinct in that a true guaranty also has a legitimate value, the
provision of greater wealth to protect the lender, while the leverage guaranty has only the illegitimate purpose of providing
12. A recent court of appeals decision refers to Two Thoughts and summarizes this, my major point, perfectly. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, 980 F.2d 792, 798 n.12 (1st Cir. 1992).
13. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 80.
14. See id
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leverage for a lender preference.' 5
Levit makes any insider guaranty less desirable to a lender
than it would be without the Levit rule, because the guaranty
may transform a payment made during the year before bankruptcy (say, six months before) into a preference, while absent
the guaranty it would not have been. Nonetheless, I suggested
that Levit would not much discourage banks from taking true
insider guaranties, because any Levit recovery of a preference
from the lender could be reclaimed by a claim over against the
security, or the solvent insider, in the same action. 16 By contrast, a bank or other lender might be discouraged by Levit
from taking a pure-leverage guaranty from an impecunious insider, because the guaranty might make a payment recoverable
as a preference when it otherwise would not have been and yet
the insider would not be able to reimburse the lender for the
7
recovery.'
Following Levit, an insider guaranty backed by security or
a solvent guarantor still makes a loan much more bankable
than it would be without the guaranty. But after Levit an insider guaranty that offers only leverage over the company is
probably a net detriment because of its effect in extending the
preference period without providing additional wealth to back
the loan. Thus, smart loan officers will read Levit to mean
they should continue to get true guaranties, but should be less
eager about pure-leverage guaranties. As long as putting up
personal wealth for the lender's exclusive benefit continues to
be viewed as a legitimate way to generate small business finance,' 8 that distinction is just what we should want. Therefore, the distinction tends to take the wind out of the sails of
Levit critics who say Levit means the end to all insider guaran9
ties and therefore a terrible harm to small business.'
Professor Alces's Response addresses for pages the effect of
the true/leverage guaranty distinction on the insiders' conduct,
which was distinctly my secondary point. The Response does
not discuss the effect on lenders' conduct, which is a far more
important point.
15. Either guaranty can also serve to provide "commitment" from an insider, which may be a legitimate lender concern. See id at 79. I ignore that
aspect for the moment, in the interest of space and clarity.
16. See id. at 81.
17. See id
18. But see id at 79 n.30 (leaving open the ultimate legitimacy of reserving certain assets for the lender's exclusive protection).
19. See id. at 86.
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Professor Alces insists throughout on talking of "good" and
'%ad" guaranties, 20 implying that I see the Levit rule as a "sanction." 21 Indeed, the Response discusses at length how my ap22
proach requires distinguishing good from bad guaranties.
Levit extends the preference period to one year for payments
to insiders whether they are "true" or "leverage" guarantors. I
never suggested any change in that result. Nor would anything
23
I said force the courts to determine the lender's "intention."
To distinguish between economic and behavioral effects that
are socially or economically acceptable and unacceptable, and to
favor Levit because it discourages the unacceptable while not
discouraging the acceptable, has nothing to do with having to
prove intention or ascertain moral desserts.
I make that point only because it is so prominent in the
Response. The more important point is that Professor Alces
takes the broad position that there can be no distinction between true guaranties and leverage guaranties. He does not
contend that my distinction is not conceptually valid, or important, but rather that it is "untenable, '2 4 because a given guarguaranty might
anty might be only partially a "true" one or the
25
change in character over the life of the loan.

It is hard to see how this point is relevant to my major contention about Levit's effect on lender incentives. Although
Professor Alces ignores the argument about the effect on
lender incentives, surely he would not have claimed that a
bank officer is incapable of making a reasonable judgment
about which security for a guaranty is likely (in an admittedly
uncertain world) to be good or what insider guarantors are
likely to be good for paying the guaranty. (If he would claim
that, he may not be a loan officer in any bank of mine.) If a
loan officer can make those kinds of judgments, then a bank
will take insider guaranties when the discounted value of the
20. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 3, at 614.
21. See id. at 622. It is even stated I want to "punish" the lender for a
"bad" guaranty. Id. at 614.
22. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 3, at 615.
23. See id. at 614.
24. See id at 621.
25. See id. at 621-25. In that connection, there are certain arguments in
the Response to which I do not reply because I do not understand them. The
paragraph on page 622 of the Response containing the following sentence is
exemplary: "Because Levit avoidability occurs at the time of the corporate
debtor's bankruptcy, the lender may avoid insider preference exposure despite
the good commercial reasons of the lender when it first took the guaranty."
Id. at 622.
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wealth behind them26 apparently exceeds the disadvantage of

an extended preference period. If your bank's loan officer is a
better golfer than "figurer," just tell her or him to take the
guaranty "if you're pretty darn sure they're good for it personally," and let it go otherwise.
For these reasons, I assume Professor Alces concedes the
point about Levit's effect on lender conduct, but his ignoring it
in his Response makes the case for Levit look much weaker
than it really is.
B. NON-WAIVER

Part of the holding in Levit could be read to permit a de
facto waiver of its protections by the insider guarantor at the
time of the original loan and guaranty. If such waivers were
effective, they would instantly become part of every lender's
guaranty boilerplate.2 7 I argued that such waivers are unenforceable. 28 The Response ignores my argument and offers no
non-waiver argument of its own. As a consequence, it strongly
implies that Levit is routinely waivable and by so doing guts
Levit without a congressional shot being fired. Yet the Re29
sponse is from a passionate Levit supporter.
The second part of Two Thoughts was devoted to the Levit
holding that its rule is triggered only where the insider guarantor is entitled to reimbursement from the debtor company and
therefore is a "creditor" of the debtor. 30 This holding could be
read to mean that a waiver of reimbursement by the insider
guarantor in the loan documents would eliminate application of
Levit by eliminating the insider's "creditor" status. I took the
position that such a waiver should not be enforced because it
has no economic or other legitimate purpose except to operate
as a prospective waiver of the estate's preference rights. Such a
waiver between the insider and the preferred lender obviously
should be unenforceable. 3 1
Professor Alces's Response completely ignores the non26.

Discounted, obviously, by the perceived risk of decline in value over

the life of the loan.
27. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 87.
28. See i&. at 88.
29. Actually, Professor Alces is ambivalent, saying at one point that his
article does not offer a defense of Levit. See Alces, supra note 3, at 634. In the
next two sentences, however, he presents himself as a supporter of Levit. See
id. at 634-35.
30. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 86-98.
31. See i&. at 88.
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Instead, he discusses a case upholding
waiver argument.
waiver 32 and says "the 'creditor' requirement must be abrogated." 33 He offers no argument to show that Judge Easterbrook erred in Levit by imposing the creditor requirement nor
does he explain how to avoid the plain words of the statute.3
Presumably, therefore, Professor Alces is demanding congressional abrogation. Pending that highly unlikely event, the concession as to waiver by the Response leaves Levit gutted. Here,
as with lender incentives, the Response ignores the forest for
the trees and in the process harms the cause it purports to
champion.
II.

THE CREDITOR REQUIREMENT

Now we have come to the point where a simple misreading
of the facts of my primary hypothetical leads to utter confusion
in the Response and no doubt in many readers as well. As
before, I first must state the point that really matters in the
discussion and then turn to the source of confusion in the
Response.
Although the practical aspect of the creditor requirement
is its relationship to waiver vel non, it has a more general intellectual interest. How does it fit within the Levit policy frameI
Why require that the insider be a "creditor"?
work?
suggested that the requirement provides a constraint that
roughly divides control of insider abuse through the preference
power from more general abuse-control doctrines like fiduciary
duty, fraudulent conveyance, and equitable subordination. 35
My primary point about the benefits of this constraint was
that its abrogation would make too many transactions problematic ex ante by forcing elaborate consideration of indirect, unquantified, even contingent benefits to insiders from particular
transfers by a debtor company. Imagine if every payment,
grant of a security interest, or other transfer by a large company nine months before its Chapter 11 filing had to be evaluated as a possible preference because of an indirect benefit of
some kind to one of its dozen directors or dozens of officers. I
argued that the transaction costs of such a rule would probably
32. See Alces, supra note 3, at 626.
33. Id at 627.
34. Bankruptcy Code § 547(b)(1) states as an element of a preference that
the transfer must have been "to or for the benefit of a creditor." 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(1) (1988).
35. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 89-90.
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be too great to justify the benefit of getting more thorough policing of insider abuse through the preference power, especially
because other insider-abuse devices could be used to deal with
the problems not addressed by preference law.3 6
The Response ignores this point and instead goes through
an elaborate discussion of the "nexus" between the benefit to
the insider and the transfer.3 7 It would be pointless to pursue
the argument here, however, because it rests entirely on a misreading of the central hypothetical in my Article.
The hypothetical involved a businesswoman, Jane Hackman, and her corporation, H Corporation. The corporation is
having some cash-flow trouble. When Hackman seeks financing for another, separate venture, the bank demands and gets
Hackman's agreement to cause H Corporation to pre-pay its
loan as a quid pro quo for the bank's financing the new, separate Hackman venture. Levit does not apply because Hackman
is not a guarantor of the H Corporation bank debt, but its policy arguably applies because the pre-payment would produce an
indirect benefit for the insider Hackman and represented an
38
abuse of her insider position.
The Response gets this wrong. Its argument turns entirely
on the assertion that my hypothetical involves "a lender who
has taken an insider-guaranty. 3 9 As noted, the whole point of
the hypothetical was that it did not involve a guaranty. The hypothetical was not ambiguous. My Article said, "The bank [demands] a guarant[y] of H Corporation's debt in exchange for
financing for the new project, but Hackman refuses. '40 It goes
on to repeat several times
that the hypothetical does not in41
volve an insider guaranty.
The result of this muddling of the facts is that the Response does not address the important questions at all. It does
address the problem of "benefit" analysis, discussed below. It
does not consider, however, the extent to which it would or
would not be helpful to have a broad range of alleged insider
36. See id. at 91-92.
37. See Alces, supra note 3, at 625-27. On the technical question of measuring preference recovery by benefit, see infra part III.B.
38. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 93-94.
39. Alces, supra note 3, at 627. A page later the Response says, "In Westbrook's hypothetical, the insider does have a claim against the debtor attributable to the specific debt she guaranteed .... ." I& at 628.
40. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 93.
41. See, e.g., id.at 94 ("unlike the insider-guarant[y] situation"); id. ("The
creditor requirement distinguishes the example from the insider-guarant[y]
case .... ).
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abuse regulated by a wide-ranging preference power unconstrained by a direct connection between transfer and benefit to
the insider. Nor does it explain how the "benefit" factor can be
avoided, given the statutory language. 42
III.

THE TECHNICAL POINTS

Because of limited space 43 and the priority commanded by
the points already discussed, my discussion of some interesting
technical points will be rather more limited than I would like.
I will address the two most important ones: the effect of Levit
on the insider's incentives; and measurement of recovery by the
amount of the benefit received by the insider.

A.

EFFECT OF LEVIT ON INSIDERS' INCENTIVES

As discussed earlier, my primary argument that Levit has a
benign influence on commerce was that it would not discourage
bankers from taking "true" guaranties, but would discourage
them from taking "pure-leverage" guaranties. Professor Alces
ignored that argument in favor of a secondary point, my claim
that Levit has a benign effect on insider conduct as well as the
choices made by lenders. 44 The argument is secondary, technical, and complex, which may explain a certain confusion in the
Response on this point. I distinguished insider incentives in a
post-Levit world from those in a pre-Levit world. I was not, as
the Response assumes, arguing that a true insider guarantor
must always have less incentive to prefer the lender than does
the leverage insider. 45 To restate the problem, we will look
separately at the effect of insider-preference doctrine standing
alone and then at the additional effect of Levit.
The case supposed is demand for a payment on an insiderguaranteed loan where the payment may threaten the survival
of the business. 46 The insider can either refuse payment and
try to save the business or can cause the debtor to prefer the
lender. If the business fails, the first course may lead to a suit
on the guaranty by the lender. Absent an indirect preference
See infra note 63.
See supra note 5.
44. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 84. Another secondary point was that
Levit was not inconsistent with the "commitment" that lenders want from the
principals of a small business. See id. at 81-83. In some respects the Response
confused these two points. See Alces, supra note 3, at 617-20.
45. See Alces, supra note 3, at 617.
46. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 83.
42.
43.
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doctrine, there is no risk of suit in the second course. The insider has an incentive, of course, to save the business, but it is
not reinforced by fear of a bankruptcy-trustee lawsuit if the
business is risked by a payment to the lender. The true insider
guarantor would have an especially powerful incentive to prefer in that situation, because that insider has personal wealth at
stake-the security for the guaranty or the insider's other personal assets.
Fortunately, we do have an indirect-preference rule in the
statute,47 and the insider knows that it may lead to an indirect
preference suit by the debtor-company's trustee. That will be
true with or without the rule in Levit. The risk is much
greater for the true guarantor, 48 because the trustee is much
more likely to sue a solvent party. 49 Thus, the indirect-prefer-

ence rule operates more powerfully to reduce the preference
incentive of a true insider guarantor.
This counterbalancing risk of an indirect-preference suit
somewhat reduces the net incentive for the insider to cause the
preferential payment on the guaranteed loan. The effect is
weak, as I noted in Two Thoughts, in the way that all preference incentives are inherently weak, 50 but it pulls in the right
direction. The risk of an indirect-preference suit somewhat increases the chance that an insider will decide that saving the
business is the better risk to take. As noted, it will have a more
powerful effect on a true guarantor, because a trustee suit is a
greater risk for that guarantor.51
All that comes from indirect-preference doctrine standing
alone, without Levit. What is the effect of Levit? Levit adds
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1988).
48.

This fact is the point that preoccupies the Response. See Alces, supra

note 3, at 616-17. It applies to any suit by the lender or by the trustee,
whether on the guaranty or to recover a preference.
49. Actually, the analysis can get much more complicated. For example,
take the case where the guaranty is a true one because of security given for it,
rather than the insider's overall wealth; the collateral for the guaranty is an
exempt piece of property available to a creditor only by way of a voluntary security interest; and the insider has no substantial non-exempt wealth. On
those facts, the trustee might not have an incentive to sue the true guarantor
for an indirect preference absent the rule in Levit, because the resulting judgment would not be enforceable against the exempt property. Obviously, however, there will be many cases with other facts where the trustee will have
that incentive against a true guarantor.
50. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 86.
51. Because Levit will encourage lenders to get guaranties only (or primarily) from insiders who are true guarantors, more insider guarantors will be
inclined to save the business rather than to prefer a lender.
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the lender as a potential plaintiff in a suit against the insider.
If the lender is not preferred, it will sue on the guaranty. If the
lender is preferred, after Levit the trustee will sue the lender
and the lender will sue over against the insider guarantor. The
additional potential plaintiff somewhat increases the risk of
suit against a true guarantor, but the increased risk is marginal,
because the true guarantor's attractiveness as a defendant
makes it highly likely the trustee would sue anyway. But it is
rule increases the
possible-I do not say certain-that the Levit
52
risk of suit against a leveraged guarantor.
As I noted in Two Thoughts, the leverage guarantor may
think the lender is a more dangerous potential adversary. 53 A
bank may sue an impecunious party where a trustee would not
bother. The lender might want to make a point to other insiders and might be more interested in threatening "to bankrupt
you" than would be a trustee, because the bank is more concerned with overall borrower motivation. Furthermore, an action over against the insider in a lawsuit already begun against
the bank by the trustee is not very expensive and may be more
likely than a lawsuit involving the insider alone. Thus, the effect of Levit may be to increase marginally the disincentive of a
leverage guarantor to prefer the lender. Again, the effect may
be weak, like most preference effects, but at least it is in the
right direction.
On this basis, the effect of Levit on the leverage guarantor
is potentially greater than its effect on the true guarantor,
although it should reduce the preference incentives of both to
some extent. I am not arguing that the preference rules operate more strongly on leverage guarantors generally;4 indeed,
the very fact that preference doctrine operates more weakly on
such guarantors is the basis for saying that Levit may have a
greater effect in reducing the preference incentives of those
leverage guarantors.

B. BENEFIT RECOVERY
Ordinarily, we have no difficulty in measuring the amount
of recovery when a transfer is voided as a preference: the en52. The Response correctly asserts that I have no empirical evidence on
this point. See Alces, supra note 3, at 620. Neither, however, does the

Response.
53. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 83-84.
54.

That is the position which the Response ascribes to me. See Alces,

supra note 3, at 617.
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tire transfer is recovered. In the more unusual case, where the
transfer was only partially a preference, recovery under Bankruptcy Code section 550 is "to the extent that" it was preferential. 55 Thus, for example, if the debtor paid $800 to X, $400 on
account of an old unsecured debt and $400 for newly delivered
goods, $400 would be the recoverable preference.
There are some problems at the frontiers of preference law
where the determination of the amount to be recovered becomes much more difficult. One notable instance is the indirect preference, and that is true whether or not we follow the
rule in Levit. In my Article, I gave the following example in a
footnote:
In the case of an insider payment, I conclude that a preference includes only the portion of the transfer that benefits the insider, and,
therefore, the trustee should recover only that portion. Thus, given a
$100,000 unsecured debt to an unaffiliated lender, an insider
guarant[y] limited to $50,000, full payment of the debt six months
before bankruptcy, and insolvency on the transfer date, the trustee
would avoid only $50,000 of the $100,000 payment. Any other result
would ignore the central role of the "benefit" to the insider and
would create a pointless distinction between making one or two payments. Acceptance of this analysis5 6would eliminate some of the concerns about the Levit line of cases.

Thus I offered the conclusion that the amount of recovery
would be measured by the benefit to the insider.5 7 The Response flatly rejects that conclusion, saying "the amount of the
transfer to the lender would be the amount of the preference,
not the value of the benefit the insider realizes."58s
Professor Alces quotes my hypothetical, but never states
what result he would assert to be correct. Nonetheless, based
on the statement of principle quoted just above, I assume he
would say that the trustee in the hypothetical case should recover $100,000. If the guaranty had been for only $5,000, the
trustee would still, presumably, get back $100,000. This argu55.

11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
56. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 96 n.91.
57. Accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, 980 F.2d 792,
796 (1st Cir. 1992). The relevance of this point was to a secondary argument
supporting the "creditor" requirement in the insider situation. I argued that if
recovery was measured by benefit, the problems that would be created by the
elimination of the creditor requirement would be exacerbated by the need to
value for recovery purposes the vague, indirect benefits received by a nonguarantor like the second-venture financing received by Jane Hackman in my
hypothetical. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 96-97.
58. Alces, supra note 3, at 631. The Response criticizes me for citing no
authority, but cites none itself.
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ment will certainly reinforce the claim by Levit's opponents
that it leads to extreme and unfair results and will therefore
hasten its repeal by Congress. Beyond that pragmatic point,
the cursory analysis in the Response gives short shrift to an important emerging problem and obscures the issues it presents.
A recent case, In re Cannon Ball Industries,59 illustrates
the difficulty. The debtor, Cannon Ball, executed a secured
note in the original amount of $750,000. Two of its shareholders guaranteed the note to the extent of $150,000. The debtor
made payments of some $43,000 on the note during the year
before bankruptcy, leaving around $400,000 owing on bank60
ruptcy day.
The trustee claimed a Levit preference and the court
agreed, although unfortunately it did not state the amount of
the recovery. 61 The opinion implies, however, that the full
amount of the payment was recoverable. 62 This result is quite
consistent with the analysis in the Response and inconsistent
63
with the result for which I would argue.
The defendant lender in Cannon Ball argued that the insiders received no benefit from the transfer because the payments never approached the guaranty limit.64 The insiders still
owed the full $150,000 guaranty amount after the payments had
been made, so how had they benefited? The court found a benefit in the reduced probability that the shareholder-guarantors
would have to pay.6 5 By implication, the entire amount of the
transfer would therefore be avoidable, no matter how small the
reduction in the probability the guaranty would be called. I
would have thought the proper result would be to value the
benefit and make the recovery avoidable only "to the extent" of
66
that benefit.
59. Cannon Ball Indus. v. Sequa Corp., 150 B.R. 929 (N.D. Ill. 1992).

60. Id at 930.
61. Id at 931.
62. See id
63. Cf.Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc., 980 F.2d 792,
802-03 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the "benefit" from contingent reduction of
exposure of an insider's property on a non-recourse guaranty is not sufficient
to trigger preference liability under § 547(b)(5)).
64. Cannon Ball, 150 B.R. at 931-32.
65. Id at 931.
66. Theoretically, there is a payment, always the present value of $150,000
or less, for which the insider could sell a "put" of the guaranty, so that the
buyer of the put would agree upon exercise of the put to assume the insider's
liability. (The present value would be discounted from the probable date of
the required payment.) To use an example like one used by the court in Cannon Ball, suppose a payment of $5,000 that reduced the loan to exactly
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The point was tangential to my Article and there is certainly too little space here to analyze it fully. My view is that
"benefit" to the insider generates the preference finding and
therefore must bear some relationship to the amount avoided.
That is what we do for other elements of a preference. When a
payment is partially on account of an antecedent debt, we avoid
that part. When a payment on an undersecured debt makes the
transferee only partially better off than it would have been, we
avoid the transfer "to the extent" of that improvement. 67 In
the same way, why not avoid an "indirect benefit" transfer to
the extent of the benefit?
It is worth noting that these issues do not arise from Levit,
as such. They exist because of the indirect preference doctrine
lodged within subsection (b)(1) of section 547 of the Code. Any
indirect preference claim requires us to decide whether the
amount recoverable is measured by the entire transfer or by
the benefit to the insider. Levit merely adds the twist of making the lender-transferee, as well as the insider, liable for that
amount. Its only policy or normative effect is to heighten the
inequity of any result that is perceived to be inequitable.
I cannot imagine anyone being terribly comfortable with
conclusions about these indirect-benefit recovery problems until we have seen more litigation, so I state them with appropriate modesty. I am certainly ready to revise my conclusions as
we see more cases. But I also cannot think it could be right to
interpret the effects of Levit as expansively as does the Response. To do so would introduce an intolerable level of uncertainty into business transactions. I am also sure that assertions
that Levit must be so broadly understood will hasten its congressional execution.
CONCLUSION
Professor Alces and I both agree that Levit states a good
$150,000. That payment, made more than 90 days before bankruptcy, would
likely improve the chances that the guarantors would not have to pay the full
$150,000, assuming the company might pay something more before failing and
no new credit would be extended. The payment the buyer of the put would be
willing to accept to assume the guaranty might therefore be something less
than $150,000 after the $5,000 payment had been made. The reduction in the
price of the put on account of the $5,000 payment might be the benefit received by the insider and therefore the amount of the avoidable preference.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988). That is what we do, although I made the
point in Two Thoughts that we have not settled on the theory by which we do
it. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 96 n.91.
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rule and should be preserved. If he felt that I defended it
badly, it would have been more helpful for him to offer a better
defense. Instead, he limited himself to criticizing my effort and
in the process undermined the case for Levit.
The most important reason to preserve the rule in Levit is
that it provides some protection for entrepreneurs, their suppliers, and their customers from overreaching by lenders. The
primary reasons for overruling it would be that lenders do not
understand its differential effects as to true and leverage guaranties or do not trust their loan officers to make credit judgments as between true and leverage insider guarantors.
Neither is a good reason for overruling Levit. Although it is
likely Levit will be swept away by an uncaring legislature, it is
just the sort of technical issue best left to the Bankruptcy Commission presently proposed in Congress. With luck, perhaps it
will be.

